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The International Human Right to Adequate Housing: 
An Economic Approach 
Sahar Segal  
Abstract 
 
International law recognizes a right to adequate housing. Affordability is one component 
of this right, and it is increasingly unrealized in highly concentrated cities in advanced economies. 
The prevailing approach to the right to adequate housing is the human rights approach, which 
favors government involvement in the market to reduce housing prices, for example, via rent-
control regulations and policies that limit the use of housing as primarily an investment. 
This Comment notes that this approach misses the critical fact that governments are already 
involved in the housing market through the imposition of zoning laws. It suggests that an economic 
approach, which sees lack of affordability as a problem of supply and demand, is better suited to 
identifying obstacles to and solutions for the realization of the affordability component of the right 
to adequate housing. This Comment calls on the U.N. to recognize this approach and use its 
resources to support states’ implementation of solutions that either decrease housing demand, for 
example, by restricting foreign residential real estate investment, or increase housing supply, for 
example, by reforming zoning regulations.  
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOUSING COSTS 
International law recognizes a right to adequate housing (“the Right”). The 
first international instrument to recognize the Right is the nonbinding Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948).1 The binding International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has the broadest language and is 
ratified by most states (169 parties, 71 signatories), stating: “The States Parties to 
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”2 Affordability of 
housing is one component of this right.3 
The U.N. Habitat III conference report on the U.N. Economic Commission 
for Europe (E.C.E.) region (which encompasses Canada and the U.S.; the 
European continent; Turkey; Israel; the Caucasus and Central Asia)4 states that 
advanced economies are struggling to realize the affordability component of this 
right:  
Lack of affordability of housing, especially for vulnerable groups, is a critical 
matter, leading to problems of accessibility to adequate housing, and 
increased spatial segregation in cities. Even though the region is a prosperous 
part of the world, homelessness and informal settlements are issues. The 
housing sector needs to respond to these changes, securing new sites for 
providing housing.5  
Although every U.N. member state has ratified at least one “soft law” instrument 
that acknowledges the Right, and most have ratified a legally binding international 
instrument acknowledging it,6 housing has become increasingly unaffordable 
across advanced economies. 
                                                 
1  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 25 § 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.”). 
2  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11 § 1, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
3  G.A. Res. 70/1, ¶ 11.1., Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
(Oct. 21, 2015). 
4  U.N. Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urb. Dev. (Habitat III), Regional Report on Housing and 
Urban Development in the Economic Commission for Europe Region: Towards a City-Focused, People-Centred and 
Integrated Approach to the New Urban Agenda, ¶¶ 32–34 and Fig. 1, U.N. Doc A/CONF.226/10 (Dec. 
21, 2016) [hereinafter ECE Report].  
5  Id. at ¶ 10. 
6  U.N. Habitat & Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., The Right to Adequate Housing: Fact 
Sheet No. 21/Rev. 1, at 1 [hereinafter Adequate Housing Fact Sheet]; see infra Section II. The United 
States has not ratified any legally binding instruments recognizing this right. 
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Three distinct trends in the past two decades are main contributors to 
increasing lack of housing affordability in urban areas of advanced economies. 
The first trend is the agglomeration of individuals into megacities7 and super-
cities8 like the Northeast corridor in the U.S. The second is the increase in 
investment in residential real estate across the globe by ultra high-net worth 
individuals and financial organizations.9 The third is the implementation and 
maintenance of restrictive zoning laws in high-cost cities and their suburbs.10 
These phenomena have led to a steep rise in housing costs in highly sought-after 
locations,11 even those that are not hubs of international residential real estate 
investment.12 
Rising housing costs—which include both purchase price and rent—are 
concerning for several reasons. First, the increasing unaffordability of large cities 
makes it difficult for those from economically stagnant locations to seek 
opportunity by moving. Indeed, interstate mobility in the U.S. has been falling for 
decades.13 This lack of mobility is a macroeconomic problem that has negative 
impacts on overall economic growth, as people are unable to move to where their 
skills are most useful.14 High housing costs can also disincentivize high-skill 
immigration and incentivize outward migration.15 Second, lack of affordability 
leads to greater economic insecurity and instability, as people spend a greater share 
of their income on housing.16 The rise in rent prices has led to increased rent 
                                                 
7  I define megacities as cities or urban agglomerations with a population of 10 million or greater. 
Urban agglomerations are the extent of the contiguous urban area. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and 
Soc. Affs. Population Div., The World’s Cities in 2018: Data Booklet, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/ SER.A/417 
[hereinafter The World’s Cities in 2018].  
8  Defined as “clusters of thriving cities in close proximity to one another.” ECE Report, supra note 
4, at ¶ 2.  
9  Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as 
a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-
Discrimination in this Context, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/53 (Jan. 15, 2018) [hereinafter 
A/HRC/37/53]. 
10  See, for example, Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in 
Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331 (2005); Kirdan Lees, Quantifying the Costs of Land Use Regulation: 
Evidence from New Zealand, 53 N.Z. ECON. PAPERS, no. 3, 2019. 
11  See International Monetary Fund, Global House Price Index (Aug. 30, 2018), http://perma.cc/X4R5-
UQ3B. 
12  See, for example, Terner Center for Housing Innovation, U.C. Berkeley, Housing in Sweden: An Overview 
(Nov. 2017). 
13  David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 81 (2017). 
14  Id. at 83. 
15  New Zealand Productivity Commission, Housing Affordability Inquiry, 22 (2012). 
16  Melanie Brebner, Auckland’s Housing Affordability Problem, 13 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 207, 211 (2014). 
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burdens, and in turn, to greater homelessness and housing insecurity.17 Third, 
housing restrictions and lack of affordability also contribute to urban sprawl and 
transportation pollution, and thus to climate change.18 
The prevailing approach to the realization of the Right is the human rights 
approach. This approach is a conceptual framework for development and policy 
that is based on international human rights standards and works to promote and 
protect human rights. It aims to ensure that the means to realizing human rights 
are themselves human rights-oriented—for example, that policies are 
participatory, accountable, and compliant with the rule of law. One element of 
this approach is that policies should “prioritize those most in need.”19 
While this approach is valuable in many ways, it is ill-suited to realizing 
housing affordability, which is primarily a problem of mismatch between supply 
and demand. Looking at housing affordability from an economic perspective 
makes it possible to identify solutions that help people at all income levels, not 
only those most in need. Economic literature shows that housing prices respond 
to the forces of supply and demand.20 While acknowledging the complexity of the 
housing market, it is generally accurate that as supply increases or demand 
decreases, housing prices decrease.21 This benefits renters and people interested 
in purchasing homes regardless of their income or wealth.  
An economic approach to the right to adequate housing is a necessary 
addition to the human rights approach for two reasons. First, it can identify some 
violations of the Right that the human rights approach cannot. Second, it can offer 
additional and more effective solutions for the realization of the affordability, 
security of tenure, and location components of the Right. 
Section II of this Comment provides an in-depth discussion of the 
international right to adequate housing and of the human rights approach. It then 
introduces the economic approach. Next, Section III describes the housing 
affordability crisis in large urban centers in advanced economies, and identifies 
                                                 
17  Thomas Byrne & Dennis P. Culhane, The Right to Housing: An Effective Means for Addressing 
Homelessness?, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 379, 390 (2011); see, for example, Marcia Rosen and 
Wendy Sullivan, Symposium, From Urban Renewal and Displacement to Economic Inclusion: San Francisco 
Affordable Housing Policy 1978–2014, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 121 (2014). 
18  ECE Report supra note 4, at ¶ 4; Brebner supra note 16, at 238. 
19  A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at 7. 
20  See, for example, Laurent Gobillon & Florence Goffette-Nagot, Introduction: Housing Economics and 
Urban Policies, 130 ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 35 (2018).  
21  See, for example, Brian Asquith et al., Panel Paper, Does Luxury Housing Construction Increase Rents in 
Gentrifying Areas? (Nov. 10, 2018) (arguing that increased construction in gentrifying areas lowers 
rents despite induced demand); Andrea J. Boyack, Property and the Challenge of Housing Affordability: 
Limiting the Collective Right to Exclude, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 451, 469 (2017) (“Excluding additional 
housing units or certain types of housing from a neighborhood limits the supply of housing, and 
caps on supply protect prices from the inevitable market-based decrease that would result from 
making more units available in a given location.”).  
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three contributing factors: urbanization, foreign investment, and restrictive zoning 
regimes. It concludes by showing that the economic approach enables legal 
thinkers to identify restrictive zoning regimes, which are in place in a wide array 
of cities in advanced economies, as violations of the Right. 
Sections IV and V show that the economic approach can identify solutions 
to the affordability crisis that the human rights approach misses. Section IV 
presents two demand-side solutions: lowering demand by restricting foreign 
investment in residential real estate and implementing vacancy taxes. Section V 
presents a supply-side solution: increasing supply by reforming restrictive zoning 
regulations. Section VI discusses possible next steps to be taken by the U.N. to 
promote the realization of the affordability component of the Right.  
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 
This Section first describes the components of the international right to 
adequate housing. It then presents the prevailing human rights approach to its 
realization and proposes the addition of an economic approach. The economic 
approach is not in conflict with the principles enumerated by the human rights 
approach, but rather adds an additional perspective that can identify problems and 
solutions missed by the human rights approach. 
Most states have ratified at least one international treaty that recognizes the 
human right to adequate housing.22 The first international instrument to recognize 
the right is the (nonbinding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).23 
ICESCR (169 parties) clearly recognizes the right: “The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to 
the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take 
appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.”24  The Right is also found 
in several other international instruments: The Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951) (146 parties),25 the International Convention on the 
                                                 
22  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1.  
23  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, at art. 25 § 1. (“Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.”). 
24  ICESCR, supra note 2, at art. 11 § 1. 
25  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 21, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137: 
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated 
by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall 
accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as 
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances.   
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (179 parties),26 the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(1979) (189 parties),27 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (196 
parties),28 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) (54 parties),29 and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006) (177 parties).30 
The human rights enforcement mechanisms of the U.N. are almost 
exclusively monitoring bodies such as Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), which monitors parties’ fulfillment of the obligations 
under ICESCR.31 CESCR hears individual complaints regarding denial of rights 
on the basis of race or ethnicity, if the individual’s state has allowed it to do so.32 
The Optional Protocol to ICESCR (OP-ICESCR) allows CESCR to hear 
complaints from individuals about ICESCR violations if all national remedies have 
been exhausted.33 However, it has been ratified by only twenty-four states.34 
                                                 
26  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5, adopted 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (“States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination . . . in the enjoyment of the following rights: . . . The right to housing.”).  
27  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 14, opened for 
signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (“States Parties shall . . . ensure to [rural] women the 
right: . . . To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply, transport and communications.”). 
28  Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 27, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (“States 
Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate 
measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in 
case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to 
nutrition, clothing and housing.”). 
29  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families art. 43, adopted Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Migrant workers shall enjoy equality 
of treatment with nationals of the State of employment in relation to: . . . Access to housing, 
including social housing schemes, and protection against exploitation in respect of rents.”). 
30  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, adopted Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 
3: 
States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate 
standard of living for themselves and their families, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions, 
and shall take appropriate steps to safeguard and promote the realization of this 
right without discrimination on the basis of disability. 
31  ESCR-NET, Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms of the United Nations, http://perma.cc/UHS4-
EE7B. 
32  Id. 
33  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 3 ¶ 
1, opened for signature Sept. 24, 2009, Doc. A/63/435 [hereinafter OP-ICESCR]. 
34  Id. 
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A. Components of the Right 
According to CESCR, the Right includes seven elements: legal security of 
tenure; availability of services; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and 
cultural adequacy.35 This Comment focuses on the rights to affordability, security 
of tenure, and location. These are the primary housing problems in advanced 
economies.36 
Affordability means that the cost of housing must not threaten or 
compromise the occupants’ enjoyment of other human rights.37 Security of tenure 
means legal protection from homelessness or forced eviction.38 Location means 
that “housing is not adequate if it is cut off from employment opportunities, 
health-care services, schools, childcare centers and other social facilities.”39 
Security of tenure requires adequate notice before eviction,40 but does not 
ban eviction generally. People who are forcibly evicted must have a right to legal 
process41 and legal aid,42 and must be compensated for their financial loss.43 
Government officials must also be present at the time of eviction.44 
These three components are interrelated. As housing becomes less 
affordable, more people are at risk of eviction because they cannot afford housing. 
Research suggests that “simple economic principles governing the availability and 
pricing of housing and the growth in demand for the lowest-quality housing 
explain a large portion of the variation in homelessness among U.S. metropolitan 
housing markets.”45 Small changes to the availability of affordable rental housing 
                                                 
35  U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4 on the Right 
to Adequate Housing, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991) [hereinafter General Comment No. 4]. 
36  This is not to say that the other problems do not exist—see, for example, the unsafe levels of lead in 
tap water in Flint, Michigan, which is a failure of habitability. U.N. Human Rights Council, Thirty-
Third Session: Agenda Items 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/33/32 (Sept. 9, 2016). 
37  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 4; General Comment No. 4, supra note 35, at ¶ 8(c). 
38  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 4; General Comment No. 4, supra note 35, at ¶ 8(a). 
39  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 4; see also General Comment no. 4, supra note 35, at 
¶ 8(f). 
40  Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Res. 60/251 of Mar. 2006, Entitled 
“Human Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component 
of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Miloon Kothari, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 
(Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur]. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. at ¶ 59. 
43  Id. at ¶ 60. 
44  Id. at ¶ 45. 
45  John M. Quigley, Steven Raphael & Eugene Smolensky, Homelessness in America, Homelessness in 
California, 83 REV. ECON. AND STAT. 37, 37 (Feb. 2001).  
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can substantially reduce homelessness.46 Additionally, as housing in cities becomes 
less affordable, people must relocate or remain in peripheral areas with less access 
to services.47  
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living (henceforth, “the Special Rapporteur”) also 
recognizes the interrelatedness of these components:  
States should take specific preventive measures to avoid and/or eliminate 
underlying causes of forced evictions, such as speculation in land and real 
estate . . . and, when necessary, intervene to ensure that market forces do not 
increase the vulnerability of low-income and other marginalized groups to 
forced eviction.48 
She thus states that it is insufficient to only create legal processes for the 
eviction process; states must also address the underlying causes of eviction, such 
as lack of affordability, in order to minimize their occurrence. 
The Right does not require states to build housing for their entire population 
or to provide free housing for the homeless.49 Under ICESCR, states have an 
obligation to “promote and facilitate access to and provide housing or assistance 
where needed.”50 The Right “implies that retrogressive measures are prohibited 
unless there are strong justifications for them. A State would have to demonstrate 
that it adopted the measure only after carefully considering all the options, 
assessing the impact and fully using its maximum available resources.”51 To 
illustrate, a retrogressive measure might be the maintenance of Central Park in 
New York City; the justification for it would be that green spaces are necessary to 
the wellbeing of people living in cities.  
The Right requires governments to create conditions in which homelessness 
can be minimized and give priority to the housing needs of the homeless.52 
                                                 
46  Id. 
47  Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, 
¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/51 (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter A/HRC/34/51]. 
48  Special Rapporteur, supra note 40, at ¶ 30.  
49  U.N. Habitat & Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Programme Document: United 
Nations Housing Right Programme (First Phase): “Contributions to the Full and Progressive 
Realization of the Human Right to Adequate Housing,” ¶ 32 (May 31, 2004); see also, Juli Ponce, 
Affordable Housing, Zoning and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Some 
Lessons from the Spanish and South African Experiences, 1 J. COMP. L. & POL’Y 95, 100 (2017). 
50  A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at ¶ 21. 
51  Ponce, supra note 49, at 100. 
52  See General Comment No. 4, supra note 35, at ¶¶ 11–12. The definition of homelessness is unsettled 
in international law. The narrow definition of homelessness is “rooflessness”; broader definitions 
consider adequacy of dwelling, risk of becoming homeless, and past experience of homelessness. 
Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 22. The U.N. Statistics Division defines homelessness 
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Addressing housing affordability more broadly would create conditions for 
minimizing, though not eliminating, homelessness. 
The right to adequate housing is subject to progressive realization.53 That is, 
a State’s compliance with its obligations is assessed in the light of the resources 
available to it.54 Even so, ‘[a] lack of resources cannot justify inaction or indefinite 
postponement of measures.’55 Within the framework of progressive realization, 
states have an immediate obligation to take concrete steps to fulfill the right to 
adequate housing (“the obligation to fulfill”).56 The obligation to fulfill “requires 
States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, 
promotional and other measures to fully realize the right to adequate housing.”57 
As the obligation to fulfill is assessed relative to countries’ available resources, it 
is difficult to define in universal terms.58 
The Right obligates states and all levels of government to create favorable 
conditions for the realization of the Right, and “the Covenant clearly requires that 
each State party take whatever steps are necessary” for achieving the full 
realization of the Right.59 It also obligates states to dismantle barriers to its 
realization, whether they be economic, legislative, administrative, or otherwise.60 
Thus, state governments are obligated to dismantle municipal regulations that 
violate the right to adequate housing, though this has not been discussed much in 
the relevant literature.  
Through their ratification of relevant human rights treaties, states are 
obligated to promote the realization of the Right at the national level. Local and 
regional governments are also bound by this Right.61 This is crucial, as localities 
cannot evade their responsibility for inhibiting the realization of the Right; they 
                                                 
as rooflessness. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, STAT. DIV., PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POPULATION AND HOUSING CENSUSES REV. 2, at 101, U.N. DOC. 
ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/67/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.07.XVII.8 (2008). 
53  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 30; ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 2(1). U.N. Declaration, 
The Habitat Agenda Goals and Principles, Commitments and the Global Plan of Action, ¶ 39 
(2003). 
54  OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Fact Sheet 33, at 13, , 
http://perma.cc/N8UY-VJVX. 
55  Id. at 14. 
56  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 33; A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at ¶ 21.  
57  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 33. 
58  A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at ¶ 21. 
59  General Comment No. 4, supra note 35, at ¶ 12. 
60  Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 33–34.  
61  Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context, 
¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/62 (Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter A/HRC/28/62]. 
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themselves are bound by it, and national governments are required to intervene if 
local governments are violating the Right. 
Affordability is a positive right, and thus difficult to enforce in a judicial 
setting. Even states that include the right to housing in their legal codes62 or 
constitutions63 do not include the right to affordability. Positive right aspects of 
the right to housing have been difficult to enforce, even in the presence of 
enforcement mechanisms.64 For example, under OP-ICESCR, CESCR has only 
heard cases regarding foreclosure and eviction.65 
B. The Human Rights Approach 
The human rights approach is a conceptual framework for development and 
policy that is based on international human rights standards and works to promote 
and protect human rights. Under this approach, policies are rooted in the rights 
and obligations established by international law.66 
The human rights approach has several core principles. First is the 
universality and inalienability of human rights—no person can choose to give up 
her rights. Second is the indivisibility of human rights from one another—no right 
is a priori more important than another. Third is the interrelatedness of different 
human rights—for example, it is difficult to achieve adequate education without 
adequate food. Fourth is the equality of human beings. Fifth is the participation 
and inclusion of persons in processes that impact their rights. The sixth principle 
is the accountability and rule of law of governments, policies, and programs.67  
These principles are all important; a policy that flouts the rule of law in order 
to realize a human right is at best deeply flawed and at worst violates human rights. 
Human rights must be respected, but the human rights approach is not the only 
approach that respects human rights. The economic approach can respect the 
                                                 
62  Some European-wide documents establish a legal right to housing, for example, the 2000 European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
art. 34, ¶ 3, 2000 O.J. (C 364). 
63  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, art. 26 (1996). 
64  Byrne & Culhane, supra note 17, at 379, 384–85 (arguing that enforcement is only one issue, using 
France as an example it highlights additional challenges including the availability of housing and 
number of procedural issues).  
65  U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Committee on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., Juris. 
Database, http://perma.cc/8L9H-9N3A; U.N. Hum. Rts. Off. of the High Comm’r, Committee 
on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., Table of Pending Cases, http://perma.cc/AD6D-G2U3. 
66  Off. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts, Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-
Based Approach to Development Cooperation, 15, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/8 (2006) [hereinafter 
HR/PUB/06/8]. 
67  Id. at 36. 
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principles outlined by the human rights approach while better solving the housing 
crisis described in this Comment.  
The Special Rapporteur, who both shapes and reflects the U.N.’s position 
on these matters, states that housing strategies should be human-rights based.68 
She lays out several principles for creating housing strategies: that they be based 
in law and legal standards; prioritize those most in need; be comprehensive; have 
rights-based community participation; provide sufficient budgeting and just 
taxation schemes; provide for human rights-based goals and monitoring; provide 
for accountability and monitoring; provide for access to remedies when violations 
are found; train private actors in human rights obligations; and implement 
international cooperation and assistance.69 
One “essential” element of the human rights approach is the focus on 
“marginalized, disadvantaged, and excluded groups”70 or “prioritiz[ation of] those 
most in need.”71 As will be shown below, this element is uniquely ill-suited to the 
affordability component of the Right. Lack of affordability in advanced economies 
is primarily a problem of supply and demand—the demand for housing in large 
cities has increased, but the supply has not, for reasons described below.  
An approach that focuses only on the marginalized identifies the problems 
of homelessness and housing insecurity. When looking only at these problems, 
the solution then seems to be increased construction of social housing,72 and 
perhaps rent-control regulations. These are both policies that target and help the 
most disadvantaged. They create housing units that have below-market rent, and 
often state that only people below a certain income threshold may reside in those 
units. Such policies help low-income populations, which is an important goal. But 
as this Comment will show, a much larger proportion of the population is cost-
burdened with respect to housing. An approach that takes a market-wide 
perspective helps both the homeless and housing-insecure and the mortgage- and 
rent-burdened middle classes. 
C. An Economic Approach 
The housing market has been studied extensively from an economic 
perspective.73 While various factors affect the cost of housing, it is undisputed that 
                                                 
68  A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at ¶ 9, see also Special Rapporteur, supra note 40, at ¶ 33(e). 
69  Special Rapporteur, supra note 40, passim. 
70  HR/PUB/06/8, supra note 66, at 37. 
71  A/HRC/37/53, supra note 9, at 7 ¶ B. 
72  “Social housing” is often called “affordable housing” in the U.S. The term “social housing” is used 
in this Comment, and affordable housing refers broadly to housing affordable to the middle classes. 
73  See, for example, Gobillon & Goffette-Nagot, supra note 20, at 35. 
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the law of supply and demand affects the housing market.74 As will be shown 
below, increased housing costs in cities in advanced economies are in large part a 
result of increased demand and insufficient increase in supply.75 Since, as this 
Comment shows, the lack of affordable housing is a result of economic forces, it 
is necessary to take an economic approach to the Right. 
The economic approach presented in this Comment focuses not on the most 
disadvantaged but on the market as a whole. It identifies the problem of lack of 
affordability as one of a mismatch between supply and demand, and identifies the 
reasons for inadequate supply or increased demand. This approach supports 
solutions that increase supply or decrease demand. 
The housing market is complex, and different locations experience demand 
for different types of housing. One location might experience demand for studio 
apartments, while another experiences demand for four-bedroom units. In 
practice, therefore, the implementation of the economic approach varies by 
location. The economic approach assumes that developers and policymakers are 
familiar with the nature of the demand in the locations in which they are operating. 
This approach suggests that the market can help mitigate the problem of housing 
unaffordability. 
The Special Rapporteur has not taken the economic approach, instead 
identifying the market as a problem and government involvement as a solution:  
The assumption, bolstered by neo-liberalism, that States should simply allow 
markets to work according to their own rules, subject only to the requirement 
that private actors “do no harm” and avoid explicit violations of human 
rights, is simply not in accordance with the important obligation to fulfil the 
right to adequate housing “by all appropriate means, including legislative 
measures.”76  
The European Court of Human Rights has also stated that states may need 
to intervene in markets when market forces cause housing to become 
unaffordable.77 
                                                 
74  Id. 
75  See Section III-A.  
76  Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, Statement during the Interactive Dialogue at the 
Human Rights Council (March 1, 2017), http://perma.cc/43M5-8SX8. 
77  See, James and Others v. U.K., 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, ¶ 47 (1986) 
[M]odern societies consider housing of the population to be a prime social need, 
the regulation of which cannot entirely be left to the play of market forces. The 
margin of appreciation is wide enough to cover legislation aimed at securing 
greater social justice in the sphere of people’s homes, even where such 
legislation interferes with existing contractual relations between private parties 
and confers no direct benefit on the State or the community at large.  
  See also Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 391 (1989) (holding that rent control laws 
are permissible under Art. 1 Protocol 1). 
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These bodies both miss that government is already deeply enmeshed in the 
housing market though zoning regulations.78 Such regulations prevent the 
construction of new housing by making construction unaffordable, time-
consuming, and even by categorically prohibiting certain types of construction.79 
The Special Rapporteur on adequate housing recognizes that rising housing costs 
are an underlying cause of forced evictions,80 and asserts that States must take 
preventive measures to avoid evictions.81 However, today, local governments are 
active creators of this underlying cause,82 and are the governing bodies most 
intransigently opposed to zoning reform.83 Governments are not following a “do 
no harm” principle—rather, they are causing harm.  
Since the problem of lack of affordability is rooted in a mismatch between 
supply and demand, any solution that increases supply or decreases demand 
should be welcomed, and solutions that do the reverse should be rejected. For 
example, legislation limiting foreign investment decreases the demand for 
housing.84 Zoning reform enables increases in housing supply. Rent control, on 
the other hand, decreases the supply of housing on the free market, thus increasing 
the rent of non-rent-controlled housing.85 Thus, rent control is not a solution to 
the overall problem of housing affordability.  
It should be noted that reforms that decrease demand or increase supply are 
not full solutions to homelessness and housing insecurity. States should also 
ensure that there is sufficient social housing to meet demand, and take steps to 
mitigate the many causes of homelessness.86 Lack of housing affordability and 
homelessness are issues that are partially overlapping, and both issues should be 
addressed in parallel.  
Any solution to the lack of housing affordability should be based in legal 
standards, be cognizant of the rights of all actors, and provide for accountability 
processes and remedies, as required by the human rights approach. However, the 
                                                 
78  See Section III-D. 
79  See Section III-D. 
80  A/HRC/34/51, supra note 47, at ¶ 5. 
81  Id. at ¶ 77(e). 
82  A/HRC/28/62, supra note 61, at ¶ 6.  
83  See, for example, Jenny Schuetz, The Renters Strike Back, BROOKINGS (Sept. 27, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/Z25F-FGA9. 
84  See, for example, Stephanie Kahn, Looking to Australia to Overhaul U.S. Foreign Investment in Real Estate, 
42 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 925 (2017) (arguing that Australia’s regulation of foreign investments in real 
estate limited the foreign demand for property and allowed Australian citizens to buy at a fair price).  
85  See generally, Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 
741 (1988). 
86  See, for example, Tracey Ross, No Place Like Home: Addressing Poverty and Homelessness in the United States, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 3–6 (2013). 
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framing of prioritizing those most in need results in a distorted picture of the 
current housing crisis. When looking at those most in need in isolation, it appears 
that the solution is rent control or increased construction of social housing. But 
when looking at the full picture of the housing market, as the economic approach 
does, it is clear that the problem is overall lack of housing.87 Due to the laws of 
supply and demand, increasing construction of all kinds of housing would increase 
the total supply of housing and lower prices at all housing price points. It is 
possible that more social housing is needed in many cities, and the economic 
approach does not conflict with this assessment; housing construction will not 
eliminate the need for social housing. However, additional construction would 
help the home-secure, many of whom are paying too much in housing costs, the 
home-insecure, who alternate between being housed and homeless because 
housing costs are too high, and likely some of the homeless population as well.  
III. OBSTACLES TO THE REALIZATION OF THE 
AFFORDABILITY COMPONENT OF THE RIGHT TO 
ADEQUATE HOUSING 
The economic approach can identify violations of the Right that the human 
rights approach misses. To identify the violations, this Section will first describe 
the housing landscape in advanced economies, including urbanization, 
investment, and zoning trends that have contributed and continue to contribute 
to increased lack of affordability. To do so, this Section will use as examples the 
cities of Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland, London, Toronto, Vancouver, and New 
York City. These cities are some of the most expensive in the world,88 and they 
have comparatively high rates of foreign residential real estate investment.89 They 
are not all megacities.90 This Section will show that the economic approach to 
housing affordability makes it possible to recognize that restrictive zoning regimes 
                                                 
87  It is worth noting that, as the Special Rapporteur noted, increasing the availability of credit to low-
income individuals is not the correct solution to high housing costs. Not only does it fail to address 
the underlying problem, but the Great Recession of 2008 proved that this is a risky and dangerous 
policy as well. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right 
to an Adequate Standard of Living, submitted by special procedures to the 67th Session of the 
General Assembly, ¶¶ 28, 64, U.N. Doc. A/67/286 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
88  Demographia, 15th Annual Demographia International Housing Affordability Survey: 2019: Rating 
Middle-Income Housing Affordability 12 (2019) [hereinafter Demographia Survey 2019]. 
89  Newmark Grubb Knight Frank, Global Cities: The 2017 Report, The Future of Real Estate in the World’s 
Leading Cities, 46–47 (2017) (The top three are Manhattan (#1), London (#2), and Sydney (#4)).  
90  The populations of Canada (37 million), Australia (25 million), and New Zealand (4.8 million) are 
likely too small to support the title of megacity. Regardless, these cities are the largest in their 
respective countries and are experiencing rapid agglomeration. See The World’s Cities in 2018, supra 
note 7, Annex Table: The World’s Cities with 1 Million Inhabitants or More in 2018, 10–29. For 
country populations, see WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, http://perma.cc/HDU2-QLCH. 
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violate the Right, and suggests a method for determining whether such violations 
have occurred.  
A. Housing Affordability 
Since the global recession of 2008, there has been increased attention to 
housing unaffordability in megacities in advanced economies.91 A 2015 study on 
the E.C.E. region showed that at least 100 million low- and middle-income people 
in the region spend more than 40 percent of their income on accommodation, 
limiting their resources for other basic needs.92  
The E.C.E. report reports that “[s]ocial and spatial inequality within and 
among the cities in the region has been growing, making high-quality urban areas 
affordable only to the most affluent,”93 and that “[l]ack of affordability of 
housing . . . is a critical matter, leading to problems of accessibility to adequate 
housing, and increased spatial segregation in cities[.] . . . [H]omelessness and 
informal settlements are issues. . . . The total stock of social housing in advanced 
economies has been reduced.”94 
A concrete example of these interrelated phenomena and their human rights 
and economic effects is California, which has two major metropolitan areas—Los 
Angeles and the San Jose-San Francisco-Oakland area. Both these areas have 
highly restrictive zoning regulations.  
Since 2010, Median Multiples95 in the six major California markets have 
increased at 7.6 times the rate of US liberally regulated major 
markets. . . . California has the highest poverty rate in the United States, adjusted 
for housing costs. California also has the highest rate of homelessness in the 
United States. . . . The state continues to be a leader in net domestic migration 
losses, having shed 550,000 more residents than moved in since 2010, with the 
rate of exodus increasing. In 2017, California's net domestic migration loss was 
three times than [sic] of 2011. There is also a significant outflow of business 
investment.96 
                                                 
91  ECE Report, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 135, 139–41. 
92  Id. at ¶ 136. 
93  Id. at ¶ 27. 
94  Id. at ¶¶ 10–11. 
95  The ratio of median house price to median household income, a commonly used measure of 
housing affordability. Demographia, 14th Annual Demographia International Housing 
Affordability Survey: 2018: Rating Middle-Income Housing Affordability 26 (2018) [hereinafter 
Demographia Survey 2018] (footnotes omitted). 
96  Id. 
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Homelessness is a human rights problem,97 and outflow of residents and 
business investment is economically disadvantageous. Rising housing costs, driven 
by agglomeration and restrictive zoning regulations, lead to human rights concerns 
and prevent cities from meeting their economic potential.  
Housing affordability is measured by the relationship between household 
income and the cost of housing, either rented or owned.98 Rental housing is 
generally considered affordable if rent is less than 30 percent of household 
income: a household is “rent-burdened” if it spends 30 percent or more of its 
pretax income on rent.99 Housing affordability for ownership purposes is generally 
measured by the median multiple, that is, the ratio of median house price to 
median household income.100 Demographia, an organization that measures 
middle-income housing affordability, considers housing prices to be affordable if 
the median multiple is 3 and under, moderately unaffordable if it is between 3.1 
and 4, seriously unaffordable if it is between 4.1 and 5, and severely unaffordable 
if it is 5.1 or above.101 This Comment uses these numbers as measures of 
affordability.  
The most expensive major housing markets, measured by the median 
multiple, are (in order) Hong Kong, Vancouver, Sydney, Melbourne, San Jose 
(California), Los Angeles, Auckland, San Francisco, Honolulu, London, and 
Toronto.102 The tables contained in the Appendix provide metrics of housing 
affordability in selected cities and their urban agglomerations (that is, suburbs). 
Where a number refers to city limits only, this is noted. The tables show that 
housing stock increase lags behind population increase, leading to the conclusion 
that the imbalance between demand and supply has contributed to an increase in 
housing costs.103 Given the median multiples of these cities, they should be 
building new dwellings faster than their population growth in order to bring down 
housing costs. 
                                                 
97  A/HRC/34/51, supra note 47, at ¶¶ 11–12. 
98  Brebner, supra note 16, at 208–09. 
99  See, for example, id. at 210–11; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, American Families Face a Growing Rent 
Burden, 4 (2018); HUD, Affordable Housing, http://perma.cc/C5SX-UYLU (defining people 
paying more than 30% of their income on housing as cost-burdened). 
100  See, for example, Demographia Survey 2018, supra note 96, at 1. This metric is imperfect because it 
leaves out interest rates and other factors that impact housing affordability. However, it is useful 
and widely used, and its simplicity is appealing, so it is used throughout. It is recommended by the 
World Bank. See Steve Mayo & William Stephens, The World Bank, The Housing Indicators Program 
(1992), http://perma.cc/NU36-GHED. 
101  Demographia Survey 2018, supra note 95, at 2. Thus, a city with a median house price of $500,000 
and median household income of $100,000 has a median multiple of 5. 
102  Demographia Survey 2019, supra note 88, at 11. 
103  See PAUL REEVES, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL HOUSING 13–16 (2005). 
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The housing affordability crisis has not gone unnoticed by those affected by 
it. In 2006, protesters set up tents in central Paris to call attention to homelessness 
and housing unaffordability in the city.104 In 2011, protestors did the same in Tel 
Aviv.105 There were street protests in Berlin, Munich,106 and Dublin107 in 2018 
regarding rising housing costs. Yet governments have been slow to respond. 
B. Factor One: Agglomeration  
Modern urbanization, which includes movement from small and mid-sized 
cities to large cities, has been occurring in many advanced economies for the past 
three decades, a trend known as agglomeration.108 The changing nature of the 
modern economy is one of the primary drivers of agglomeration:  
The principal driver of city economies in the region since [1996] is the 
combined effect of the knowledge economy and the digital revolution. The 
former concerns the production and trading of knowledge through 
universities, spin-off companies, and the like. By and large, these institutions 
and their supporting “ecosystems” are an important part of agglomeration 
economies and they are concentrated in cities. The digital economy has seen 
explosive growth over the past 20 years, and it has underlined and accelerated 
the importance of the knowledge economy. These aspects of economy – 
knowledge and digital production, trading, consumption and their 
agglomeration – have replaced manufacturing and industry as the primary 
forces of economic development, and they have permanently morphed the 
service sector as the principal driver of the economy of the [E.C.E.] region’s 
cities. These economic forces concentrate and strengthen the importance of 
cities and clusters thereof, and provide the economic imperative . . . to 
[migrate to cities].109 
The most recent U.N. conference on cities, Habitat III, which was held in 
2016, identified the trend in the E.C.E. region of “the agglomeration into super-
cities . . . such as the metropolitan region[ ] from Boston to Washington.”110 It 
                                                 
104  Byrne & Culhane, supra note 17, at 379. 
105  Harriet Sherwood, Israeli Protests: 430,000 Take to Streets to Demand Social Justice, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 
4, 2011), http://perma.cc/TM76-FZ9H. 
106  Notker Oberhäuser, Germany’s Soaring Housing Prices Spark Calls for Reform, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Sept. 
21, 2018), http://perma.cc/E7HB-XYZK. 
107  Feargus O’Sullivan, Dublin’s Housing Crisis Reaches a Boiling Point, CITYLAB (Sept. 14, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/HTB7-P7FF. 
108  Country-specific agglomeration data is available at U.N. Dep’t of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Div., World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision, 55–60, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/420 (2019).  This trend is not limited to advanced economies; Lagos, Nigeria, has 
grown from a city of 1.4 million in 1970 to a megacity of 13.5 million today. See Lagos Population 
2018, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW (Dec. 7, 2018), http://perma.cc/NSA4-DG6K. 
109  ECE Report, supra note 4, at ¶ 89. 
110  Id. at ¶ 2.  
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noted a concomitant “countervailing trend towards shrinking cities within less 
successful and more remote regions.”111 As a result, in many countries in this 
region there is a geographic mismatch between the supply of housing and demand 
for it.112 
C. Factor Two: Foreign Investment 
Foreign investment in residential units that are left empty for occasional use 
concerns many city residents because of its impact on housing prices and rent. 
Residences that are left vacant decrease housing supply, and under general 
economic principles this decreased supply may lead to increased housing costs.113 
An example of this phenomenon is present in New York City, which in 2017 had 
74,945 vacant units not available for sale or rent because they were held by their 
owners for “occasional, seasonal, or recreational use.”114 This is 2.1 percent of the 
city’s total housing stock,115 which is unavailable as housing for city residents. 
Nationally, around 1.5 percent of homes were vacant and held off the market for 
occasional use in 2018.116 This includes homes in locations that are seasonal by 
nature, unlike New York City.  
The Special Rapporteur recognizes the status of real estate as an investment 
as problematic in her 2017 report: 
Housing and commercial real estate have become the “commodity of choice” 
for corporate finance and the pace at which financial corporations and funds 
are taking over housing and real estate in many cities is staggering. The value 
of global real estate is about US$217 trillion, nearly 60 per cent of the value 
of all global assets, with residential real estate comprising 75 per cent of the 
total. In the course of one year, from mid-2013 to mid-2014, corporate buying 
of larger properties in the top 100 recipient global cities rose from US$600 
billion to US$1 trillion. Housing is at the centre of an historic structural 
transformation in global investment and the economies of the industrialized 
world with profound consequences for those in need of adequate housing.117 
                                                 
111  Id. at ¶ 3. 
112  See, for example, HOUSING IN SWEDEN: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 12, at 10. 
113  Jim Chappelow, The Law of Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 29, 2019), 
http://perma.cc/B3J6-J7H7. 
114  E. Gaumer, Selected Initial Findings of the 2017 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Housing Preservation and Dev., 1 (2017) [hereinafter HVS 2017]at 17 (Table 8). 
115  Id. at 9 (Table 1), 17 (Table 8). 
116  Current Population Survey (CPS) and Housing Vacancy Survey (HVS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 4, 
2019), http://perma.cc/8PJN-LPMX. 
117  A/HRC/34/51, supra note 47, at ¶ 3. 
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This transformation in the nature of housing, particularly in cities, is 
occurring at the same time as a major wave of agglomeration into megacities and 
super-cities. 
As of 2018, there are over 42 million High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) 
(net worth greater than $1 million) globally,118 and 225,810 Ultra-HNWIs 
(UHNWIs) (net worth  greater than $30 million) globally.119 An increasing number 
of these individuals are diversifying their portfolios by purchasing overseas real 
estate. For example, 74.2 percent of China’s HNWIs have invested or are 
considering investing overseas.120 Of those Chinese HNWIs who have completed 
an investment, 40.6 percent have invested in overseas real estate.121 UHNWIs 
across the globe are highly interested in purchasing residential real estate for 
personal use and investment122 and are less interested in other types of real 
estate.123  
Globally, in 2019, UHNWIs own 3.63 homes on average (up from 2.9 in 
2015).124 42 percent own a home outside their main country of residence.125 The 
distribution of these non-primary homes is uneven across the globe, with the most 
common second home locations located in Europe, the U.S., and Australia.126  
Data regarding nonresident foreign buyers of U.S. homes is unclear. One 
survey shows that from April 2018 to March 2019, nonresident foreign buyers 
accounted for 2 percent of existing home purchases, down from 3.3 percent 
                                                 
118  ANTHONY SHORROCKS ET AL., CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GLOBAL WEALTH DATABOOK 
2018 119 (2018). 
119  VINCENT WHITE ET AL., WEALTH-X, WORLD ULTRA WEALTH REPORT 2018 26 (2018). 
120  Yiran Zheng, High Net Worth Individuals are Investing Overseas: Report, CHINADAILY.COM.CN (Apr. 15, 
2018), http://perma.cc/RJ3L-4KPQ. 
121  Id. 
122  KNIGHT FRANK, THE WEALTH REPORT 2015 47–51, 69 (2015). When asked whether their UHNWI 
clients were “becoming more interested” in investing in residential real estate, 100% responded 
affirmatively regarding clients in Africa, 84% for clients in Asia, 69% for clients in Australasia, 82% 
for clients in Europe, 77% for clients in Latin America, 85% for clients in the Middle East, 75% 
for clients in North America, and 100% for clients in Russia/CIS. Id. at 69. 
123  Id. at 69; KNIGHT FRANK, THE WEALTH REPORT 2017 64 (2017).   
124  KNIGHT FRANK, THE WEALTH REPORT 2019 90 (2019); KNIGHT FRANK, THE WEALTH REPORT 
2015 68 (2015). On average, UHNWIs in Africa own 3.4 homes (up from 2.5 in 2015); UHNWIs 
in Asia own 3.92 homes (up from 3.3 in 2015); UHNWIs in Australasia own 2.71 homes (up from 
2.3 in 2015); UHNWIs in Europe own 3.35 homes (up from 2.6 in 2015); UHNWIs in Latin 
America own 4.71 homes (up from 3 in 2015); UHNWIs in the Middle East own 4.63 homes (up 
from 3.8 in 2015); UHNWIs in North America own 3.17 homes (up from 2.9 in 2015); and 
UHNWIs in Russia/CIS own 3.13 homes (up from 3 in 2015). Id. 
125  KNIGHT FRANK, THE WEALTH REPORT 2019 90 (2019). 
126  Id. at 90. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 506 Vol. 20 No. 2 
during the previous twelve months.127  Another survey shows that these numbers 
are 1.4 percent and 1.9 percent.128 Nearly half of properties purchased by non-
resident foreign buyers every year since 2009 are located in suburban areas, while 
only 25-30 percent are located in central urban areas.129  
Estimates of foreign investment in London vary widely. It is clear, though, 
that a significant proportion of homes in the Kensington & Chelsea, City of 
London, and Westminster neighborhoods are second homes—both of foreign 
investors and of U.K. residents or citizens.130 One estimate shows that “[o]verseas 
buyers account for roughly half of all residential transactions in central 
London.”131 This estimate may be too high. In 2013–2014, Savills estimated that 
one third of high-end ‘Prime London’ market buyers are from overseas.132 The 
majority of international buyers (62.5 percent) are buying property as their main 
residence.133 In a 2013 report, Knight Frank estimated that 49 percent of Prime 
London sales worth over £1 million were to foreign nationals, but that a smaller 
proportion (28 percent) of sales were to people not resident in the UK.134 
University of York researchers report that 13 percent of new-build properties sold 
in London between 2014 and 2016 were bought by overseas buyers. The 
proportion rose from 10.5 percent in 2014 to 17.9 percent in 2016.135 They found 
variation within London: overseas buyers accounted for 36 percent of sales in 
‘prime’ boroughs (the City of London, Westminster, and Kensington & Chelsea) 
compared to 16.2 percent in the rest of inner London and 5.7 percent in outer 
London.136 The researchers also looked at the distribution across price bands, and 
                                                 
127  See NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN U.S. RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE 2019 11 (2019), http://perma.cc/Y3FQ-54NQ. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at 21. 
130  See Jonathan Bourne, Empty Homes: Mapping the Extent and Value of Low-Use Domestic Property in 
England and Wales, 5 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS (Feb. 13, 2019), http://perma.cc/T2LK-
YMAK. See also Sarah Knapton, £123 Billion of Property is Barely Used in Britain as Experts Call for 
Empty Home Tax, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 13, 2019), http://perma.cc/KEH4-8HC9. 
131  Nishant Kumar, London Luxury Homes Face New Hit as U.K. Plans Foreign Buyer Tax, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 30, 2018), http://perma.cc/282T-KDLU. 
132  Sophie Chick, Spotlight: Prime London Residential Market, SAVILLS WORLD RESEARCH 6 (Sept. 2014). 
133  Wendy Wilson & Cassie Barton, Foreign Investment in UK Residential Property, 1 (House of Commons 
Library Briefing Paper No. 07723, July 17, 2017). 
134  KNIGHT FRANK, INTERNATIONAL BUYERS IN LONDON 2 (2013), http://perma.cc/5M2H-NRCD. 
135  ALISON WALLACE, DAVID RHODES & RICHARD WEBBER, UNIVERSITY OF YORK CENTRE FOR 
HOUSING POLICY, OVERSEAS INVESTORS IN LONDON’S NEW BUILD HOUSING MARKET 7 (2017). 
136  Id. at 8. 
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found that overseas buyers are under-represented in the lower price bands and 
over-represented in higher price bands.137  
There is some evidence that foreign investment increases housing prices.138 
As this Section showed, a significant proportion of foreign purchases are non-
owner-occupied, that is, they are non-primary homes. The extent to which 
restrictions on non-owner-occupied purchases and other policies that discourage 
vacancy can reduce prices varies by city, since each city’s housing market is 
different. 
D. Factor Three: Zoning Regulations 
Zoning regulations have a significant impact on housing prices in the cities 
discussed throughout this Comment. Few cities with restrictive zoning regulations 
have sufficiently increased their housing stock. On the contrary, many retain 
zoning regulations that limit construction and thus increase housing prices, such 
as height restrictions.139   
There is a significant body of research showing that zoning and land use 
regulations increase the housing prices of major cities around the globe. For 
example, Reserve Bank of Australia researchers estimate that “as of 2016, zoning 
raised detached house prices 73 percent above marginal costs in Sydney, 69 
percent in Melbourne, 42 percent in Brisbane, and 54 percent in Perth.”140 
Regarding apartments, they estimate that “zoning restrictions added AU$120,000 
to the cost of apartments in Melbourne and AU$110,000 in Brisbane” and 
“AU$400,000 to apartments in Sydney.”141 These figures represent the zoning 
“premium.” 
Zoning and other regulations add an estimated 56 percent (NZ$530,790) to 
the cost of housing in Auckland and 48 percent to the cost of housing in 
Wellington (NZ$302,678).142 In 2012, the government of New Zealand conducted 
                                                 
137  Id. at 12. 
138  See, for example, Gabriel Bruneau, Maxime Leboeuf & Guillaume Nolin, Canada’s International 
Investment Position: Benefits and Potential Vulnerabilities, BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYS. REV. 43 (June 2017); 
Hassan Fereidouni Gholipour, Usama Al-mulali & Miswan Abdul Hakim Mohammed, Foreign 
Investments in Real Estate, Economic Growth and Property Prices: Evidence from OECD Countries, 17(1) J. 
ECON. POL’Y REFORM (2014). But see C. Tsuriel Somerville, Long Wang & Yang Yang, Using Purchase 
Restrictions to Cool Housing Markets: A Within-Market Analysis, J. URB. ECON. (forthcoming 2019), 
http://perma.cc/KT7V-DEPK. 
139  See Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, 5B HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL 
AND URB. ECON. 1289 (2015) (collecting and summarizing sources). 
140  Ross Kendall & Peter Tulip, The Effect of Zoning on Housing Prices, 10–11 (Econ. Res. Dep’t, Res. Bank 
of Austl., Res. Discussion Paper 2018-03, 2018). 
141  Id. at 20–21. 
142  Lees, supra note 10, at 17–18.  
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a study and concluded that “[a] planning system that is unresponsive to growth is 
a key driver of escalating land prices.”143  
In Auckland, residential buildings in areas zoned for terrace housing and 
apartment buildings, which is the highest-intensity residential zoning, are limited 
to a height of 16 meters (five to six stories).144 Only a small fraction of the 
Auckland metropolitan area is zoned for this intensity.145 These zoning restrictions 
artificially limit the number of housing units in the city, contributing to rising 
housing costs. 
It has been estimated that in 2001, the cost of housing in Manhattan was 150 
percent higher than it would have been without restrictive zoning regulations.146 
As prices have continued to increase, it is unlikely that this ratio has decreased. 
These effects are staggering. In Sydney and Melbourne, detached housing 
prices are 70 percent higher than they would be absent zoning regulations. In 
Auckland, all housing is more than 1.5 times more expensive than it would be 
absent zoning regulations. The same is true in Manhattan. In a free market, 
urbanization would lead to increased housing prices, which would, in turn, lead to 
increased housing construction and lowered housing prices. However, due to 
restrictive zoning regulations, the third step of the process is not taking place. 
Instead, prices are increasing and there is no exit valve to release the upward 
pressure on housing costs. This is an international crisis affecting middle-income 
and low-income persons. 
America’s cities generally have the lowest densities in the world.147 Unlike 
most other countries, zoning is controlled by local governments.148 Almost all U.S. 
zoning laws have height requirements, use restrictions, minimum lot sizes, and 
parking requirements.149 A 2018 study by the National Multifamily Housing 
Council shows that regulation from all levels of government contributes to an 
average of 32.1 percent of multifamily development costs in the U.S.150 Research 
shows that in the U.S., areas with restrictive zoning regulations have greater 
                                                 
143  Press Release, New Zealand Government, Government Response to the Productivity 
Commission’s Report on Using Land for Housing 2 (Aug. 2016) (on file with the Chicago Journal 
of International Law). 
144  Auckland Council, Auckland Unitary Plan, H6.6.5 (Oct. 24, 2019), http://perma.cc/7QFJ-8NRL. 
145  See Auckland Unitary Plan Geomaps, http://perma.cc/EB93-93LK. 
146  Glaeser, supra note 10, at 350. 
147  WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 10–11 (2015).  
148  Id. at 28, 33. 
149  Id. at 31–32. 
150  NAT’L ASSOC. OF HOME BUILDERS & NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUSING COUNCIL, REGULATION: 
OVER 30 PERCENT OF THE COST OF A MULTIFAMILY DEVELOPMENT 8–9 (2018). 
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income inequality than less regulated areas do.151 This has contributed to income 
inequality in the U.S. more broadly.152 There is a broad consensus among housing 
developers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and government 
committees that there is an insufficient supply of housing in cities to meet 
demand, and that it is largely attributable to restrictive zoning regulations.153 
E. The Economic Approach: Zoning and Violation of the Right 
to Adequate Housing 
Given the impact of zoning regulations, it is perhaps surprising that it has 
not been asked whether zoning regulations violate the Right. The economic 
approach, which looks at the housing market as a whole, enables legal thinkers to 
identify this question as one worth asking. The U.N. has not explicitly discussed 
zoning and land use regulations as causes of rising housing costs or asked whether 
certain land use regimes violate the Right. It has primarily discussed city planning 
and land use as means for improving housing conditions, especially as regards to 
preventing and responding to climate change.154 The question of whether zoning 
regulations violate the affordability or security of tenure components of the Right 
is not a major subject of academic debate.155 Thus, there is no real guidance on 
whether certain zoning regimes violate the Right. 
The Right “implies that retrogressive measures are prohibited unless there 
are strong justifications for them. A State would have to demonstrate that it 
adopted the measure only after carefully considering all the options, assessing the 
impact and fully using its maximum available resources.”156 An example of a 
justified measure is regulation that allows for or requires open-air spaces such as 
                                                 
151  See, for example, Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. 
Declined?, 102 J. URBAN ECON. 76 (2017). 
152  Id. at 79. 
153  See The Cost of Regulation on Affordable Multifamily Dev.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Ins. of 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. passim (2018) (statement of Sue Ansel, Chairwoman of the 
National Multifamily Housing Council and Chief Executive Officer of Gables Residential). 
154  See, for example, U.N. Conf. on Housing and Sustainable Urb. Dev. (Habitat III), New Urban Agenda, 
¶¶ 72, 86, U.N. Doc. A/RES/71/256 (2017); UN-HABITAT, INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON 
URBAN AND TERRITORIAL PLANNING 1 (2015). 
155  There exists discussion on whether it violates the non-discrimination component of the Right. See 
Adequate Housing Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 10. There is also an article arguing that zoning violates 
various rights to health, since zoning causes health disparities. See Travis Bergmann & Partho P. 
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156  Ponce, supra note 49, at 100. 
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parks.157  The Right does not require that every available space be used to construct 
housing. 
A zoning regime that does not allow for any new housing construction likely 
violates the right to adequate housing. There is an obligation to create favorable 
conditions for realization of the Right, and there is likely no “strong justification” 
for the retrogressive measure of prohibiting all new construction.  
In practice, though, zoning regulations do not prohibit all new construction. 
The level of detail inherent in all zoning regimes makes them very difficult to 
analyze.158 Height restrictions, minimum parking requirements, minimum lot sizes, 
and many other regulations contribute to the zoning premium. It is complicated 
and unrealistic to examine all the specific regulations in zoning regimes to 
determine if they violate the Right.  
Instead, it would be easier to assess whether a zoning regime violates the 
Right by examining the extent to which it increases housing costs. This zoning 
“premium” has been measured by academics, and it is an easy concept to 
understand. Using this metric, it is possible to circumvent questions such as 
whether height restrictions violate the Right, or whether a three-story limit violates 
the Right but a ten-story limit does not. Assessing violation based on a zoning 
regime’s impact rather than on its components is both easier to measure and likely 
less controversial. Measuring a violation through the zoning premium also enables 
violating localities to decide which zoning regulations to change, should they 
choose to take action.  
Identifying which zoning premium violates the Right is outside the scope of 
this Comment. Ideally, the U.N. or other international body would examine this 
issue in greater depth and provide an answer to this question with a clear 
justification and standards based on an economic analysis. 
Another possible metric to measure violation of the Right is the median 
multiple. However, it is an inferior metric to the zoning premium. As more 
housing is constructed, it is possible that the median income will drop as more 
people are able to afford to move to a city. Thus, the median multiple might stay 
the same even as housing prices drop. Since the median multiple captures two 
figures—income and house price—it is inferior to the zoning premium, which 
captures only one figure. 
The economic approach enables legal thinkers to identify restrictive zoning 
regulations as potential violations of the Right. The human rights approach, on 
the other hand, struggles to do so, since zoning regulations do not violate a 
person’s rights or any principles of the human rights approach. An approach that 
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looks at housing from a higher-level, market-oriented position, like the economic 
approach, makes it possible to see that zoning regulations, in their totality, can 
result in a violation of the Right. 
IV. DECREASING DEMAND: RESTRICTING FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE AND TAXING 
OCCASIONAL-USE RESIDENCES 
This Section presents two related solutions to lack of housing affordability: 
limiting demand by restricting foreign investment in residential real estate and 
implementing vacancy taxes. These solutions are consonant with the economic 
approach rather than the human rights approach for several reasons. First, they 
use the market framework, and use legislation to impact incentives and lower 
demand. Second, unlike the human rights approach, these solutions do not focus 
on the most disadvantaged, as they target demand for units that are at the higher 
end of the market.159 Third, subjects of this legislation—foreign investors—do not 
participate in the legislative process, contrary to the human rights requirement that 
policy and legislation be participatory.  
It is noteworthy that the economic approach is not synonymous with a 
laissez-faire approach. It is consonant with the Special Rapporteur’s statement 
that:  
The assumption, bolstered by neo-liberalism, that States should simply allow 
markets to work according to their own rules, subject only to the requirement 
that private actors ‘do no harm’ and do not violate the rights of others, is 
simply not in accordance with the important obligation to fulfil the right to 
adequate housing by all appropriate means, including legislative measures.160  
Restricting foreign investment and implementing vacancy taxes are 
legislative measures that shape market incentives. They are not actions that 
“simply allow markets to work;” rather, they intervene in the housing market. 
As described in Section IV-A, these solutions have been in place in Australia 
and the United Kingdom for several years and have recently been implemented in 
New Zealand, Vancouver, Toronto, and Washington, D.C., in large part due to 
popular political pressure. Due both to the recency of much of this legislation and 
to the tumultuous nature of the global housing market over the past decade, it is 
difficult to assess the success of these efforts in slowing housing prices. There is 
evidence that foreign investment increases housing prices,161 though a study of the 
Chinese housing market suggests that restricting non-owner-occupied purchases 
                                                 
159  See supra Section III-C for a description of units purchased by foreign investors. 
160  A/HRC/34/51, supra note 47, at ¶¶ 1, 4, 14. 
161  See, for example, Bruneau et al., supra note 138; Gholipour et al., supra note 138. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 512 Vol. 20 No. 2 
reduces activity levels but does not reduce housing prices.162 More research is 
needed to produce reliable conclusions about the effectiveness of such legislation, 
and it is to be expected that effectiveness varies by city, since each city’s housing 
market is different. Regardless, restrictions on foreign investment reflect one 
economic approach to housing affordability: use of legislation to decrease 
demand. 
This Section will first describe policies designed to limit foreign investment 
and occasional use of residences and their effectiveness. It will conclude with an 
assessment of the effectiveness of these policies and discuss the value of the 
economic approach. 
A. Restrictions on Foreign Investment and their Impact 
Certain countries and cities have responded aggressively to foreign 
investment. Some have prohibited foreign residents from purchasing residential 
real estate and raised taxes on purchases by foreign entities. Some have instituted 
vacancy taxes on vacant residences and raised taxes on purchases of second 
homes, regardless of owner residency.  
These laws are often the result of popular pressure to limit foreign 
investment, since it is seen as a significant contributor of rising housing costs. In 
London, for example, both citizens and think tanks pressured the government to 
restrict foreign investment.163 New Zealand voters were concerned about land 
sales to foreign buyers as well.164 In Vancouver, 84 percent of residents blamed 
foreign buyers for the housing crunch in their city.165 As discussed above, there is 
some evidence that foreign investment contributes to rising housing costs, but it 
is not clear-cut and varies by city. 
1. Some cities and states prohibit foreign residents from purchasing 
residential real estate.  
Australia and New Zealand both prohibit foreign residents from purchasing 
residential real estate. Australia passed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers 
Act in 1975, which, as amended, requires foreign purchasing of residential units 
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to be approved by the Foreign Investments Review Board.166 Purchases of newly-
built dwellings and of land appropriate for residential dwelling development are 
generally approved.167  
New Zealand passed the Overseas Investment Amendment Bill in August 
2018 (amending the Overseas Investment Act of 2005) to prohibit foreign persons 
and entities from purchasing residential real estate without government 
approval.168 Overseas investments are approved if they pass the “benefit to New 
Zealand test.”169 In the residential context, approval is given to developers who 
plan to construct more housing units and/or rent out units they propose to 
purchase, and to purchasers who reside primarily in New Zealand.170  
Foreign purchases in Australia have increased sharply since 2010,171 so it is 
unclear whether the Act has had great effect. It seems that the Act has primarily 
spurred the construction of new housing, which foreign residents are almost 
always permitted to purchase.172  
2. Some cities and states tax “second home” purchases and residential 
real estate purchases by foreign entities. 
The United Kingdom enacted the Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) in 2003, 
which taxes land transactions in proportion to the purchase price of the 
property.173 In 2016, the SDLT was reformed to add a 3 percent surcharge for 
buyers of second homes.174 The Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings (ATED) 
was introduced in 2013, and taxes all dwellings valued at GB£ 500,000 or above 
that are owned by non-natural persons.175 In 2013, the U.K. also raised the SDLT 
tax on purchases by non-natural persons by 15 percent. Since 2013, on sale or gift 
of a residential property by a natural or non-natural foreign person, the seller must 
                                                 
166  Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). See also Austl. Gov’t, Foreign Inv. Rev. 
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pay a capital gains tax (CGT) of 18–28 percent.176 Foreign residents may claim 
relief from the CGT by residing in the property for at least 90 days in a tax year.177  
In 2010, 12 percent of U.K. homes and 26 percent of London homes had 
overseas owners.178 By 2017, the numbers had dropped to 5 percent and 11 
percent, respectively. 179 The number of long-term empty homes (that is, vacant 
for six months or more) in London has halved between 2006 and 2018, from 
approximately 40,000 to 20,000.180 Notably, almost 15,000 homes became 
occupied between 2010 and 2012.181 The decrease in long-term empty homes may 
be related to the implementation of higher taxes on vacant and second homes in 
2003. However, the decrease may also be related to the emergence from the Great 
Recession, which may have led to the renovation of dilapidated homes.  
British Columbia, in August 2016, and Ontario, in April 2017, established a 
15 percent tax in Vancouver and Toronto, respectively, on residential acquisitions 
by foreign residents (a “foreign home buyer tax”).182 The Toronto tax does not 
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Budget Measures Act (Housing Price Stability and Ontario Seniors’ Public Transit Tax Credit), 
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apply to acquisitions of multi-residential rental apartment buildings with more 
than six units, showing that it targets individuals buying for investment 
diversification or personal use rather than developers. Housing prices in 
Vancouver have continued to rise since the implementation of the tax.183 
3. Some cities and states have recently passed vacancy taxes. 
Vancouver established a vacancy tax in November 2016 (which took effect 
in 2018) on residential units that are vacant for more than half of the year.184 The 
city estimated that there were 10,800 vacant units, though this figure is disputed.185 
Primary market vacancy rates in areas subject to the tax increased by 0.1 percent 
since implementation, whereas they increased by 0.2 percent in areas not subject 
to the tax.186 Thus, it appears that it did not have an immediate effect on vacancy 
rates. Toronto is currently researching the effects of such a tax and may implement 
one as well. 
Australia amended its Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act in 2017 to 
assess a vacancy fee on foreign-owned vacant residential units: “A vacancy fee is 
payable by a foreign person for any dwelling on residential land, for any year 
(called a vacancy year), if the dwelling is residentially occupied for less than 183 
days in the year.”187 The effects of this tax are still unknown. 
Most U.S. jurisdictions do not have higher property taxes for vacant 
residential property. However, since 2016, Washington, D.C. has taxed residential 
property at 0.85 percent and vacant residential property at 5 percent with the goal 
of decreasing the number of intentionally vacant units.188 This tax has raised 
revenue, but its effect on vacancy is unknown, especially as it appears that some 
owners are attempting to avoid the effects of the tax by misreporting 
information.189 
                                                 
183  Erica Alini, The Vancouver Foreign Homebuyer Tax is One Year Old. Here’s What Canada Can Learn From 
It, GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 1, 2017), http://perma.cc/SUJ7-FLM7. 
184  A By-Law to Impose and Collect a Vacancy Tax, By-Law No. 11674 § 2 (2016)..  
185  Frances Bula, Vancouver’s Empty-Homes Tax to Rake in $30 Million in First Year; Many Properties 
Exempted, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 23, 2018), http://perma.cc/UQ6L-NPCG. 
186  Karin Larsen, Empty Homes Tax Not Helping Rental Crisis, Generating Millions More for Vancouver: Report, 
CBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018), http://perma.cc/2B3E-Y2VF. 
187  Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth. pt 6A, div 1, para 115A). 
188  Real Property Tax Rates, D.C. OFFICE OF TAX AND REVENUE, http://perma.cc/PK5Y-BBEB. 
189  Elaine S. Povich, Can Extra Taxes on Vacant Land Cure City Blight?, PEW STATELINE (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://perma.cc/3DTF-R3CX. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 516 Vol. 20 No. 2 
B. Decreasing Demand and the Human Rights Approach 
The legislative techniques described in Section III-A have had mixed success 
in decreasing foreign investment. It may be that in some locations taxes are too 
low, that they allow for loopholes, or that vacancy taxes rely too heavily on 
voluntary reporting of vacancy by homeowners. It is likely that states and localities 
will continue to amend these laws to increase their effectiveness. The U.K. has 
done so over the past decade, and the rate of foreign ownership and vacant 
properties in London has indeed decreased.  
The Special Rapporteur has written about foreign investment as a 
problem,190 and has suggested that to combat the financialization of housing (that 
is, the use of housing as primarily an investment), “[s]trategies must affirm the 
social function of land and housing and adopt measures to curb speculation, stop 
the production of unneeded luxury housing and prevent the privatization of public 
land.”191 However, “[a] human rights-based approach focuses on the realization 
of the rights of the excluded and marginalized populations.”192 Limiting the 
production of luxury housing is not a solution that focuses on excluded and 
marginalized populations.  
The Special Rapporteur realizes that the solution to housing affordability 
must address housing at all income levels, but this is in tension with the human 
rights approach. In this sense, the human rights approach is ill-suited to 
responding to the housing affordability crisis.  
The economic approach does not prioritize marginalized populations, and 
thus there is no tension between realizing the right and enacting policies that help 
the middle and upper middle classes. The approach also lends specificity to the 
terms used by the Special Rapporteur. One way of “stop[ping] the production of 
unneeded luxury housing” is by lowering demand for it through taxation. The 
economic approach thus provides a more effective framework for considering the 
affordability crisis. 
V. INCREASING SUPPLY: REFORMING RESTRICTIVE ZONING 
REGULATIONS 
This Section presents a second solution to lack of housing affordability: 
increasing supply by reforming restrictive zoning regulations. The economic 
approach enables legal thinkers to see that zoning is a major contributor to 
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increased housing prices and to identify zoning reform as one remedy for lack of 
affordability.  
The Special Rapporteur states that, per the human rights approach, “[z]oning 
amendments and land use decisions should be subject to independent oversight 
to ensure transparency, accountability to communities and absence of 
corruption.”193 However, as William Fischel of Dartmouth College and others 
show, communities in the U.S. and Canada often favor restrictive zoning 
regulations; the reason for this is the incentive to keep home values high, not 
corruption.194 The human rights approach demands that solutions be community-
centered and participatory, and does not have the tools to address situations where 
community participation contributes to the problem.  
The economic approach is better equipped to address housing 
unaffordability, and zoning reform in the U.S. and Canada in particular. Outside 
the U.S. and Canada, many zoning decisions are made at national or sub-national 
levels, not at the local level. This Section therefore will focus on zoning reform in 
the U.S. and Canada.  
This Section will first show that zoning reform can lower housing costs. It 
will then show that opposition to zoning reform and the construction of social 
housing comes from local communities. It will conclude that effective solutions 
for zoning reform pose a challenge to the human rights approach but not to the 
economic approach. 
A. The Impacts of Zoning Reform 
Research suggests that reforming zoning regulations to allow more 
construction would increase the supply of housing and lower housing costs. 
Zoning restrictions are identified by experts—academics, NGOs, and 
developers—as one of the primary causes of the shortage in multifamily 
housing.195 For example, Erika Poethig of the Urban Institute stated that 
“removing barriers to multifamily development, such as exclusionary zoning, 
would increase supply and lower development costs.”196 Lower development costs 
result in lower housing costs and rents.  
This is not to say that such reforms are sufficient to solve the housing 
affordability crisis. First, many agree that more social housing or subsidies for low-
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income families are needed.197 Second, local regulations interact with state and 
federal regulations and with local politics, such that local changes alone may be 
insufficient to increase supply. For example, it seems that recent upzoning in 
Chicago has not led to an increase in the number of newly permitted dwellings.198 
The housing market is complex, and zoning reform will have different outcomes 
in different markets. 
There are different proposals for zoning reform, such as limiting community 
review, eliminating parking requirements, expediting approval for affordable 
housing, and establishing “density bonuses.”199 The details of such reforms are 
outside the scope of this Comment. It is noteworthy, however, that some of them 
involve taking discretion out of the hands of local communities. 
B. Opposition to Zoning Reform  
Opposition to zoning reform often comes from local homeowners. 
Professor Fischel has written extensively about the incentive structure that leads 
to this. The “homevoter hypothesis” is that since homes are the most significant 
portion of most homeowners’ net worth, they strongly oppose decisions that 
might cause their home values to decrease.200 Fischel also argues that locations in 
the U.S. with stronger local government have more restrictive zoning regulations, 
because the more local the government, the more it is controlled by homeowners 
rather than developers (who support looser zoning regulations).201 Susan Ansel, 
on behalf of the National Multifamily Housing Council, testified before Congress 
that: 
[M]any localities have a development preference that works against 
multifamily housing production and ultimately worsens the country's 
affordability challenges. Multifamily development often faces stiff 
community resistance, competes with other forms of real estate that produce 
sales tax revenue desired by municipalities and is subject to increasing 
regulatory barriers at all levels of government.”202 
Concerns about reduced home values can overlap with discrimination 
against specific racial groups and the developmentally disabled. Guidelines issued 
by the province of Ontario call on municipalities to limit public meetings when 
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they are not necessary to allow affordable or group-home development for this 
very reason: 
[I]f zoning rules already allow the housing being considered (“as-of-right”), a 
meeting is not required. Yet many local councillors call meetings anyway, 
which often gives voice to discriminatory discussions. In these meetings, 
people wishing to live in the housing are subjected to hurtful comments and 
a level of negative scrutiny that none of their potential neighbours had to face 
when moving into the neighbourhood. These meetings also reinforce the 
incorrect assumption that neighbourhood residents have the right to approve 
who moves in next door, and often inflame, rather than calm, neighbourhood 
opposition to the housing. They also inflame the potential for human rights 
complaints [by targets of discriminatory comments].203 
These guidelines also state that instituting additional code requirements for 
affordable housing, including “arbitrary caps on the number of residents allowed 
by project, ward, or municipality” is a technique often attempted by local citizens 
to exclude low-income residents.204 
Local communities are often the cause of restrictive zoning regulations and 
rising housing costs, particularly in suburbs but increasingly in cities as well.205 
States as diverse as California, Connecticut, and South Carolina have begun to 
recognize this, and have attempted to wrest control from localities. Increasing 
awareness of the housing crisis has led many states to introduce housing bills in 
2018; some have succeeded and some have failed.206 The House Subcommittee on 
Housing and Insurance has held a hearing on this matter as well, indicating 
Congressional recognition of this problem. 
C. Increasing Supply and the Human Rights Approach 
The human rights approach states that “processes should be transparent and 
participatory.”207 This requirement creates a discomfort with policies that are 
designed to make processes less participatory. Thus, the human rights approach 
is ill-suited to deal with problems that are caused by community participation, 
such as restrictive zoning regulations. 
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This discomfort is perhaps what drives the Special Rapporteur to state that 
“[z]oning amendments and land use decisions should be subject to independent 
oversight to ensure transparency, accountability to communities and absence of 
corruption.”208 Zoning decisions are in fact quite accountable to communities and 
there is no evidence of unique corruption by zoning or planning boards. The 
economic approach has no need to present the reality of zoning in this light. 
Carol Galante, a former Housing and Urban Development official and 
current professor of affordable housing and urban policy at the Terner Center for 
Housing Innovation at the University of California at Berkeley, stated regarding 
community zoning that “[s]ometimes you have to go to a higher authority. We 
had to do that in the civil rights movement.”209 The human rights approach does 
not lend itself well to situations that demand this. 
The economic approach is less concerned with community participation. On 
the contrary, the field of economics is familiar with markets that perpetuate 
normatively bad outcomes and require external intervention to be corrected.210 
Community zoning, which creates restrictive zoning regulations that successfully 
inflate housing prices by limiting supply, is one such cycle. It would not be rational 
for homeowners to choose a strategy that might lower their home values when 
there exists a proven strategy for increasing or maintaining them. It is therefore 
consistent with the economic approach to state that other levels of government 
should intervene in local government decisions in order to make their decisions 
less participatory. 
VI. NEXT STEPS: THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 
This Section discusses practical next steps that can follow from this 
Comment’s argument that the economic approach is better suited to the 
affordability (and thus, security of tenure and location) component of the Right. 
It suggests specific steps the U.N. and the Special Rapporteur can take in light of 
this Comment. First, they can adopt the economic approach with respect to the 
affordability component of the Right and support states’ attempts to institute 
reforms. Second, they can define “affordability,” a term that is currently poorly 
defined.  
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A. Adopting the Economic Approach and Supporting State 
Efforts 
The U.N. should adopt the economic approach as a supplement to the 
human rights approach with respect to the affordability component of the right 
to adequate housing. Adopting this framework would give the Special Rapporteur 
an additional, useful framework with which to approach the Right. 
For instance, adopting this approach might motivate the U.N. or the Special 
Rapporteur to study the effects of zoning regimes on housing prices, which would 
lead to a discussion of zoning regimes’ capacity to violate the Right. Ideally, 
adopting the approach would result in concrete analysis of zoning regimes that 
violate the right to adequate housing. One way for international bodies to support 
states is for the Special Rapporteur and other relevant bodies to assess and state 
whether restrictive zoning regimes violate the Right.  
Though the U.N. has no real ability to enforce the affordability component, 
it is an important source of research and international law analysis. Currently, the 
Special Rapporteur devotes great effort to combating the financialization of 
housing, that is, the use of housing “as a way to park excess capital.”211 The Special 
Rapporteur can influence states’ thinking on these issues due to her platform. 
Adopting the economic approach can therefore influence states’ and cities’ 
thinking on this matter. 
Professor Daniel Hemel of the University of Chicago has argued that 
international law has greater impact when authority over one matter is fragmented 
across several domestic agencies.212 Zoning is fragmented across various legislative 
authorities. The U.N.’s informal influence can have an effect on local, regional, 
and national policy. Some U.S. states, for example, may choose to be bound by 
ICESCR on the matter of the Right, just as California and other states chose to 
abide by the Paris Agreement of 2016 when the U.S. announced its plans to leave 
the agreement.213 Thus, there are several ways in which clear statements from 
international bodies might impact zoning reform at the state and local levels. 
Additionally, clear statements about zoning and the application of soft 
pressure can give states and cities the political support they need to pass zoning 
reform, which can often be unpopular. A clear statement on this matter can give 
legislators the political support they need to overcome local opposition. 
The U.N. can also help formulate best practices for zoning reform, both 
suggesting specific reforms and suggesting changes to the process by which 
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zoning regulations are made. International bodies have a role to play in supporting 
state policy decisions, raising awareness, and formulating clear and detailed policy 
suggestions that are easy to adopt. Though lack of housing affordability is a local 
problem that does not lend itself well to intervention by international 
organizations, there is no need for each state to reinvent the wheel. International 
organizations can undertake research and analysis that will support states as they 
tackle this crisis. 
The U.N. has already begun to develop a body of research regarding urban 
planning and, in particular, environmentally sustainable urban planning. For 
example, the Habitat III conference of 2016 resulted in a non-binding resolution, 
endorsed by the General Assembly in 2016, which “lays out standards and 
principles for the planning, construction, development, management, and 
improvement of urban areas.”214 The International Guidelines on Urban and 
Territorial Planning suggests that local authorities should design and promote  
[r]egulations that encourage social mixing and mixed land use, with a view to 
offering an attractive and affordable spectrum of services, housing and 
working opportunities for a wide range of the population.215 
More such resources can support states as they work to realize the right to 
adequate housing. 
The U.N. can also begin adjudicating affordability matters via the ICESCR 
Optional Protocol, which allows individuals to file complaints with the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. That said, this is unlikely to be effective 
because it would require the U.N. to better define affordability and identify judicial 
remedies for violations of this component of the Right.216 The U.K. and France 
have established a justiciable right to a home, but it appears that although such 
suits draw political attention to homelessness, they have been unsuccessful in 
tangibly increasing the construction of social housing in these states.217 Thus, this 
possibility is unlikely to be very effective. 
B. Defining “Affordability” 
A major challenge to the realization of the affordability component is that 
“affordability” is poorly defined. Currently, the definition is that the cost of 
housing must not threaten or compromise the occupants’ enjoyment of other 
human rights.218 The hesitation to strictly define this positive right is unsurprising. 
However, since it is standard practice to consider households spending greater 
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than 30 percent of their income on housing to be cost-burdened, there already 
exists a practical definition of unaffordability. All that remains is to enshrine it in 
international law.  
Defining affordability concretely would encourage states to confront the fact 
that the affordability component is unrealized within their borders. Currently, 
states can avoid doing so because affordability is undefined, so it is impossible to 
articulate definitively that the component is unrealized. Acknowledging the 
violation of a human right is the first step to solving it.  
Greater specificity is necessary if the Right is to be realized. This is true both 
in defining affordability and in identifying violations of the Right. Realizing 
positive rights in general can be quite difficult; the vague terms surrounding the 
Right only add to this difficulty. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Lack of affordable housing is a crisis in large cities in advanced economies. 
This crisis impacts society at all levels. It affects individuals and families who 
cannot afford to live in the most productive cities. It affects national economies, 
since it inhibits the productivity of these states’ largest and most productive cities. 
And it affects the globe, as this crisis contributes to urban sprawl and carbon 
emissions, and thus to climate change.  
The U.N. recognizes that the international human right to adequate 
housing—in particular, the affordability, security of tenure, and location 
components—is unrealized in these localities. However, it has only given 
consideration to the human rights approach, which is incapable of solving this 
crisis and realizing this right. Housing is a market, and the high cost of housing is 
a market problem that will respond to market solutions. 
The economic approach, which looks at housing affordability from a market 
perspective, is better suited than the human rights approach to identifying 
violations of the right and policies for realizing it. The reason for this is that lack 
of affordability is, fundamentally, a supply-and-demand problem. An approach 
that uses this framework is thus better able to address the conditions that lead to 
rising housing costs. 
The solution to lack of affordability should not be only human-rights based 
but also economic, since the problem is rooted in a mismatch between supply and 
demand. Solutions that increase supply, such as zoning reform, or limit demand, 
such as legislation limiting foreign residential real estate investment and instituting 
vacancy taxes, should be welcomed. For example, the economic approach allows 
legal thinkers to see that restrictive zoning regulations violate the right to adequate 
housing. They are retrogressive measures that violate the requirement to create 
favorable conditions, and they have no strong justification. Municipalities are thus 
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obligated to reform their zoning regimes if they violate the Right, and if they refuse 
to do so, states are obligated to intervene. 
The human rights approach is in tension with these solutions. Two 
components of this approach are the focus on the marginalized and the 
establishment of participatory, transparent processes. Zoning reform requires, in 
many cases, making zoning less participatory, which is in tension with that 
approach’s focus on participatory processes. Limiting foreign investment and 
levying vacancy taxes targets the high-end market and does not help the 
marginalized. Though there may be a trickle-down effect from the increase in 
high-end housing stock, it is not significant enough to be considered a solution 
that helps the marginalized. 
It should not be concerning that the solution to high housing costs is to 
make processes less participatory. First, these “participatory” processes by 
definition exclude important stakeholders, specifically, people who want to move 
to a locality but cannot afford to do so. In practice, they also exclude renters and 
public housing residents, who are less likely to join local planning boards. 
Community zoning and planning boards are thus not as participatory as they 
appear. Second, local interests are not the only interests that should be considered. 
In the United States, the emphasis on hyper-local control of residential patterns 
has contributed to residential segregation.219 In all the cities discussed in this 
Comment, local control pushes people further from city centers due to lack of 
affordability. Thus, local control has impacts beyond the specific locality in which 
decisions are made. For these reasons, focusing on local, participatory processes 
is misguided in the housing context. These processes do not include all the 
stakeholders, and they impact people who do not participate these processes. 
Nor should it be concerning that these solutions do not focus only on the 
marginalized. Kimberly Rosario, a teacher at Mission High School in San 
Francisco, makes approximately $70,000 annually.220 She is not among the 
economically marginalized in society. And yet, she is forced to commute from 
Sacramento—over 100 miles—every day, because she cannot afford to live in San 
Francisco.221 The rights of people like Rosario, who have advanced degrees, are 
middle-income, and are not economically marginalized, must also be taken 
seriously. 
The human rights of all persons matter. An economic solution should not 
trample on individuals’ human rights. However, the human rights approach is 
different from protecting human rights. The economic approach, unlike the 
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human rights approach, can address the housing affordability crisis while also 
respecting human rights. 
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VIII. APPENDIX 
 Auckland Sydney Melbourne 
Median Multiple 9.0i 11.7ii 9.7iii 
Rent-to-income  Ratio of average rent 
of a one-bedroom 
apartment to 
average income is 
28%.iv 
 
Other  13% of households 
in the bottom 40% 
of income earners 
spend over 30% of 
their income on 
rent.v 
9.7% of 
households in 
the bottom 40% 
of income 
earners spend 
over 30% of 
their income on 
rent.vi 
Population 
increase 2010 to 
2018;  
 
Percent increase 
2010: 1.335mvii 
2019: 1.582mviii 
 
 
18.5% 
2010: 4.166mix 
2019: 4.859mx 
 
 
16.6% 
2010: 3.932mxi 
2019: 4.870mxii 
 
 
23.8% 
Housing stock 
increase;  
 
Percent increase 
2013: 508,216xiii 
2018: 545,127xiv  
 
7.3% 
2011: 1.720mxv 
2016: 1.856mxvi 
 
7.9% 
2011: 1.636mxvii 
2016: 1.832mxviii 
 
12% 
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 London NYC 
Median Multiple 8.3xix 5.5xx 
Rent-to-income 35.3%xxi 52.5% of renters in the 
metropolitan area are 
rent burdened.xxii 
Other Average private rental 
costs in London are 
double those of the 
average of rental costs 
elsewhere in the 
U.K.,xxiii but incomes 
are only 1.4 times 
higher.xxiv 
Percent of income spent 
on a mortgage (median) 
is 27.7%.xxv 
Population increase 2010 
to 2018;  
 
Percent increase 
2010: 8.044mxxvi 
2019: 9.177mxxvii 
 
14.1% 
2010: 8.190mxxviii 
2018: 8.399mxxix 
 
2.6% 
Housing stock increase; 
 
 
 
Percent increase 
City Limits 
2010: 3.336mxxx 
2018: 3.556mxxxi 
 
6.6% 
City Limits 
2011: 3.352mxxxii 
2017: 3.469mxxxiii 
 
3.5 % 
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 Vancouver Toronto 
Median Multiple 12.6xxxiv 8.3xxxv 
Rent-to-income  Ratio of average rent of 
a one-bedroom 
apartment to average 
income is 30%.xxxvi 
Population increase 
2010 to 2018;  
 
Percent increase 
2010: 2.278mxxxvii 
2019: 2.556mxxxviii 
 
12.2% 
2010: 5.499mxxxix 
2019: 6.139mxl 
 
11.6% 
Housing stock increase; 
 
 
 
Percent increase 
City Limits 
2011: 286,740xli 
2016: 309,418xlii 
 
8% 
2011: 2.079mxliii 
2016: 2.235mxliv 
 
 
7.5% 
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